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Abstract 
Recessions and policy interventions in labour markets in developing countries are 
characterized not only by changes in the unemployment rate, but also by changes in the 
proportion of formal or protected jobs. This reallocation between formal and informal jobs is 
large and occurs mainly because the job finding rate of formal jobs reacts substantially more 
than the job finding rate of informal jobs. This paper presents a search and matching model to 
capture this fact. I assume that firms operate the within firm margin of formality, choosing to 
legalize only those matches that are good enough to compensate the costs of formality. In this 
framework, recessions or stricter regulations in the labour market trigger two effects. As 
expected, they lower the incentives to post vacancies (meeting effect), but also affect the 
firms’ hiring standards, favouring informal contracts (offer effect). This new channel sheds 
light on how the actions of policy makers alter the outcomes in an economy with informal 
jobs. For instance, attempts to protect employment by increasing .ring costs will reallocate 
workers to informal jobs, where job separation is high. They are also likely to increase 
unemployment. 
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1 Introduction
Developing countries are characterized by the fact that between 40% to 80% of the
labour force is employed in semi-illegal irregular jobs.1 This type of employment has
been called the informal employment. A less known fact is that the proportion of
informal employment varies considerably both during the business cycle and when
there is a change in policy. The share of informal employment in Mexico oscillated
4 percentage points every four years during the 1992-2004 period, increasing sharply
in recessions. Similarly, informal employment increased in Brazil in 12 percentage
points throughout the 1990s as a result of a mix of policy reforms and downturns.
Evidence on the underlying worker ows in Mexico and Brazil provides insights
on how these changes are generated.2 First, the job nding rate of formal jobs is
strongly procyclical and highly volatile. Conversely, the job nding rate of informal
jobs is relatively stable and does not present a strong cyclical pattern. Furthermore,
despite signicant increases in the job separation rate in informal jobs, the proportion
formal employment decreases in recessions. This pattern also seems to be present in
the reallocation of workers in Brazil in the 1990s.
This paper provides a framework that is able to explain these stylized facts. I
construct a model that focuses on the within rm margin of informality. Firms can
potentially hire either formal or informal workers. They decide their optimal level of
formality according to the quality of the match and the cost of formal employment. I
show that this mechanism can explain the di¤erent behaviours of the job nding rate
of formal and informal jobs, as well as the changes in the share of formal employment.
The motivation for modeling this margin is rooted in two observations in the data.
First, evidence suggests that rms are not entirely formal or informal. Around 25%
of owners of small rms (4 or 5 employees) report the use of a combination of formal
and informal contracts. Similarly, on average, a non-trivial proportion of formal
rms employ informal workers. Around 30% of the jobs in medium sized rms (11-50
employees) and 8% in large rms (more than 250 employees) are informal. Secondly,
rms seem to modify this degree of compliance with labour regulations over the
business cycle. In periods of expansion 15% of the ows from unemployment into
large rms result in an informal contract. In the middle of the 1995 crisis in Mexico
this proportion doubled. This suggests that rms in developing countries do not only
1See Hart (1972), de Soto (1989) and Schneider and Enste (2000) for extensive reviews of the
causes and consequences of this type of employment. See also Djankov et al. (2002) and Schneider
(2003) for detailed cross country estimates of the size of the informal economy for developed and
developing countries.
2See Bosch and Maloney (2006) and Bosch et al (2006).
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adjust the number of workers they desire to employ, but also the type of contractual
relationships they establish with their employees.
In this model, the rms choice of hiring standards plays a primary role in the ad-
justment of the labour market. Firms post "generic" vacancies and, when the worker
arrives, they decide whether to establish a formal or an informal relationship. The
outcome depends on the quality of the match and the trade-o¤s between formal and
informal employment. As standard in search and matching models, a positive macro-
economic shock fosters vacancy creation. Hence, the number of meetings between
rms and workers increases (meeting e¤ect). Moreover, rms extend the use of for-
mal contracts because they can take better advantage of the increase in productivity
(o¤er e¤ect). As a result, the job nding rate of formal jobs increases, since the two
e¤ects, the general macro e¤ect and the substitution e¤ect, reinforce each other. The
e¤ect on the job nding rate of informal jobs is ambiguous, because the two e¤ects
go in opposite directions, and therefore, it can be procyclical or countercyclical.
Furthermore, this paper provides a tool to study the e¤ects of policy changes
on the allocation of workers in developing countries. I examine the impact of three
labour market interventions: hiring costs, ring costs and payroll taxes. I argue that
the e¤ect of policies do not only occur through the creation of vacancies and destruc-
tion of jobs, but also through the e¤ects on the rms hiring standards. For instance,
protecting formal jobs by raising ring penalties reduces the job separation rate in
formal jobs. However, changes in the rms hiring decisions reallocate jobs from for-
mal into informal employment. That is, production is shifted from "protected" jobs,
where job separation is low, to "unprotected" jobs, where job separation is high. The
quantitative e¤ects of policies on unemployment will depend on how much labour is
reallocated from one type of jobs to the other. This, in turn, depends on the op-
portunity costs of employing informal labour. I argue that in developing economies,
where the wedge between formal and informal technology is low and enforcement is
likely to be decient, small regulatory changes can have a large reallocation e¤ect.
Two alternative explanations could be put forward to rationalize the di¤erent
behaviour of the worker ows and the changes in the share of formality. First, it
could be argued that the cyclical patterns are due to compositional changes in the
industry/occupation mix. While the manufacturing sector employs primarily formal
jobs (around 80% of jobs are formal), the service sector extensively uses informal
labour (only 40% of jobs are formal). Therefore, shocks a¤ecting disproportion-
ately the manufacturing sector during recessions could be the driving force behind
changes in the proportion of formal jobs. I show that the patterns observed in the
data cannot be explained by such compositional e¤ects. Hence, in recessions, the
increase in informality occurs, largely, because the share of formal employment de-
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creases in all industries, occupations and population groups, not because labour is
reallocated from "low informality" industries/occupations towards "high informal-
ity" industries/occupations.
The second possible explanation relates to policy regulation. Consider an econ-
omy populated by two types of rms, formal and informal. If severance payments
constrain ring decisions of formal workers, then shocks for formal rms have to be
fully absorbed through the hiring margin. Informal rms, on the contrary, are able to
use both margins and therefore are able to adjust to the desired level of employment
much quicker. This faster adjustment of informal labour would necessarily increase
the proportion of formal employment during recessions, which is at odds with the
data.
This paper is related to a growing literature on the existence of informal jobs in
the labour market.3 Previous papers have studied two other margins along which
informal jobs are created. First, a series of models focus on the workers decision
to participate in the informal labour market. They usually assume the exogenous
existence of both formal and informal rms posting vacancies. Then, heterogeneous
workers direct their search towards one of the two type of rms according to their
moral costs of operating in the informal sector (Fugaza and Jaques, 2002 and Kolm
and Larsen, 2002), to workers education (Kolm and Larsen, 2004), or to productivity
di¤erences (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006).4 Other types of models endogenize the rms
choice. Kugler (1999) assumes that rms sort themselves into formal or informal
statuses according to their ex-ante productivity levels. Workers are then matched
randomly into formal and informal rms. Antunes and Calvalcanti (2004) and Bosch
(2004) suggest occupational choice models. Agents are allowed to decide between
becoming a formal entrepreneur, an informal entrepreneur or workers in search of a
job. Finally, Albrecht et al. (2006) argue that workersproductivity is the major
determinant of participation in the informal sector. In a model with heterogeneous
workers, they show that the appearance of informal jobs is rooted in the decision of
low productivity workers to become informal self-employed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the empirical evidence on worker ows for Mexico and Brazil. Section III presents
the details of the model. Section IV outlines the main predictions of the variables
of the model when the economy is subject to macroeconomic shocks or changes in
regulations. Section V presents some extensions of the model that accommodate
3For early models of the informal sector in developing countries see Lewis (1954), Harris-Todaro
(1970) and Fields (1990). Also see Loayza (1996) for and Satchi and Temple (2006) for growth
models with informal jobs.
4Alternatively, Bouev (2002) suggests that workers may search randomly.
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some particularities of informal employment. Section VI calibrates the model and
quanties the possible e¤ects of policy on the unemployment rate and the share of
formality. Finally, section VII concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
There is broad agreement in the literature on the denition of an informal worker.
Generally speaking, formal workers are those working in rms licensed with the gov-
ernment and conforming to tax and labour laws, including minimum wage directives,
pension and health insurance benets for employees, workplace standards of safety
etc. The informal workers, on the contrary, are those owners of rms that are largely
delinked from state institutions and obligations and employees who are not covered
by formal labour protections.
The motivation for this model is drawn from the study of gross worker ows in
Mexico and Brazil during the last two decades (Bosch and Maloney, 2006 and Bosch
et al., 2006). Detailed labour surveys in Mexico and Brazil allow me to compute
with precision not only the proportion of informal employment in the economy, but
also the gross movements of workers among employment statuses (see Appendix B
for details). Workers are classied into formality/informality on the basis of lack of
compliance with labour legislation- in particular lack of contributions by the employer
to the social security agency as the critical distinguishing characteristic5. Empirical
papers, including Bosch and Maloney (2006) and Bosch et al. (2006) distinguish
between two types of informal workers: informal salaried employees and informal
self-employed. I choose to pool together these two types of employment and focus
on "informality" as a whole based of the lack of protection criteria. Although these
two types of employment may have di¤erent considerations, they share very similar
dynamics in and out of employment. Moreover, they both constitute a very exible
"unregulated" source of labour for formal rms.6 Nevertheless, I explicitly consider
how to integrate the self-employment decision in latter sections of the paper.
In what follows I summarize the main facts emerging from the data. Figures
1 and 2 show the two main indicators of the functioning of Mexican and Brazilian
labour markets, the unemployment rate and the share of formal employment. First,
unemployment rates are relatively low compared to OECD countries. Despite major
macroeconomic shocks in these two countries during the 1980s and 1990s, the un-
5Contributions to social security programs by the employer implicitly impose a series of com-
mitments for the rm, such as paid vacations, minimum wages, severance payments etc.
6Excluding self-employed workers from the sample does not qualitatively change the results.
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employment rate never reaches the two digit numbers. Second, informality comprises
a substantial part of total employment (between 35%-45%). Informality is mainly
countercyclical, increasing especially in periods of deep recessions, such as 1995 in
Mexico and 1982-83 in Brazil. Finally, whereas Mexico has not undertaken a major
labour reform since the 1970s, Brazil went through a number of reforms during the
1980s and 1990s, the most signicant of which was a change in the constitution in
1988. Three changes in regulations a¤ected directly the labour market. There was a
signicant increase in ring costs, the numbers of maximum working hours per week
was reduced from 48 to 44, and union power was enhanced. Although the e¤ect of all
these policies is di¢ cult to estimate7, it is clear that from the begging of 1990s Brazil
experienced a major shift in the allocation of workers between formal and informal
jobs. The share of formal employment went from over 65% of total employment to
53% in roughly 10 years. Also, average unemployment increased from 3% to 8%.
Gross worker transitions underlying the evolution of the stocks provide further
insights in understanding these labour markets. Figures 3 and 4 show the job nding
rate of unemployed workers in Mexico and Brazil for the two types of jobs together
with the unemployment rate.8 Similarly, gures 5 and 6 show the separation rates.
Table 1 summarizes the cyclical properties of the series. The data unveils im-
portant patterns. The job nding rate of formal jobs is strongly procyclical. The
cross correlation of the job nding rate with respect to unemployment is very high,
-0.86 and -0.81 for Mexico and Brazil respectively. Conversely, the job nding rate
of informal jobs does not result to have a profound cyclical pattern. It is weakly pro-
cyclical in Brazil and slightly countercyclical in Mexico. Overall, the large recessions
and recoveries in these two countries during the 1980s and 1990s brought important
changes in the job nding rate of formal jobs with only minor uctuations in the job
nding rate of informal jobs.
Moreover, these patterns in the job nding rate do not only correspond to the
cyclical behaviour of the labour market. Long run trends also seem to be dominated
by adjustments in the job nding rate of formal jobs. After the reform in Brazil,
the monthly job nding rate of formal jobs decreased from 0.15 to 0.05, whereas job
nding rate of informal jobs stayed on trend around 0.22.
7The constitutional reform in Brazil coincided with an the process of trade liberalization of the
economy.
8The transition probabilities presented in gures 3 to 6 correspond to quarterly transitions for
Mexico and monthly transitions quarterly averaged for Brazil. Hence mobility level is not entirely
comparable between these two countries. Throughout the paper I refer to them as the job nding
and job separation rates although technically correspond to discrete transition probabilities. The
continuous transition rates for Mexico and Brazil respectively follow exactly the same cyclical
pattern. See Bosch and Maloney (2006) and Bosch et al. (2006).
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Table 1: Correlations and Volatility of HP detrended Worker Flows
Mexico Brazil
x Corr(u; x) Std(x)/Std(u) Corr(u; x) Std(x)/Std(u)
F.emp (0.53) 1.18 (0.57) 0.76
JFRf (0.86) 2.29 (0.81) 1.96
JFRi 0.24 1.27 (0.29) 1.22
JSRf 0.75 0.27 0.32 0.14
JSRi 0.92 0.65 0.91 1.17
JFRj=Job Finding Rate of j type of jobs, j=formal, informal
JSRj=Job Separation Rate of j type of jobs, j=formal, informal
u=Unemployment rate. F.emp=Share of Formal employment.
Source: ENEU 1987-2004
Additionally, the job separation rate is countercyclical in both types of jobs.
However, it is substantially higher for informal jobs. On average, around twice as
high. Furthermore, the volatility of the job separation rate in informal jobs is also
higher. This is especially true for Brazil where the job separation rate in formal
jobs is reasonable constant over time.9 However, despite large increases in the job
separation rate in informal jobs in recessions, the share of the formal employment
decreases in downturns. This highlights that the behaviour of the job nding rate is
driving the reallocation of workers between formal and informal jobs.
This paper abstracts from direct ows from occupied jobs. I do consider ows
from informal jobs into formal jobs in one of the extensions of the model. In prac-
tice, direct transitions between formal and informal jobs do occur. Nevertheless, the
empirical evidence from direct ows does not contradict, in essence, the modelling
approach (see Bosch and Maloney, 2006). That is, the hiring behaviour of rms is
the main driving force of changes in the share of formal employment. Flows from
informal towards formal jobs are highly procyclical, very much like those from unem-
ployment. Similarly, ows from formal to informal jobs are also largely procyclical
but less volatile than the former. Quantitatively, this implies that changes in the
share of formal employment are primarily driven by access to formal jobs rather
than increasing outows from formal jobs.
9The empirical evidence of the Brazilian reform is still inconclusive. Paes de Barros and Corseuil
(2001) fail to nd any robust ndings on how job destruction rates were a¤ected by this reform.
This is consistent with the data previously presented. Figures 4 and 6 seem to suggest that the
major adjustments were concentrated in the job nding rate of formal jobs and that job separation
rate was not substantially altered.
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2.1 Compositional e¤ects.
It could be argued that the patterns found in share of formal employment are due to
changes in the composition of the labour force or in the industry/occupational mix.
For instance, manufacturing is mainly formal, between 75% to 80% of workers are
formal. Conversely, services employ informal labour extensively (only 40% of jobs
are formal). Therefore asymmetric shocks to these industries could be behind the
patterns the share of formal employment. I investigate this hypothesis further. I use a
probit model where I regress the probability of being a formal worker (conditional on
employment) on a set of time dummies. This gives the unconditional evolution of the
share of formal employment similar to gures 1 and 2. I also run the same regression
but including, sex, age, education, industry and occupational dummies in addition
to the time dummies. Figures 7 and 8 present the pattern of the time dummies of
these two regressions for Mexico and Brazil. The di¤erence between the two series
captures the amount of time variation in the share of formal employment that can
be explained by observables. These gures suggest that compositional changes are
not the explanation to the procyclicality of the share of formal employment.
2.2 Changes in the Formalization of Firms: The within rm
margin.
I argue that the observed changes in the job nding rates can be explained by mod-
elling rms hiring choice between formal and informal labour. There is evidence
that rms conduct part of their operations informally. Kenyon (2006) shows that
the percentage of sales reported by Brazilian rms ranges between 60% in micro rms
to 80% in very large rms. Moreover, Maloney (2004) points at anecdotal evidence
from Latin America suggesting that medium to large rms will commonly have a
substantial share of their operations, including workers o¤ the books. In Argentina,
even individual workers will receive pay, partly blanco on the books and partly
negro o¤ the books and without the corresponding labour taxes paid by either
worker or rm.
This is conrmed by my data. Table 2 shows the share of formal employment, as
well as, the proportion of hires from unemployment that result in a formal contract
by rm size in Mexico.10 The degree of formalization of a rm is invariably related to
its size. Indeed, small rms are mostly informal (only 15% of employment is formal).
However, table 2 suggests that the lack of compliance with labour laws is not exclusive
of small rms. Large rms, which are in all likelihood formal in other dimensions,
10Unfortunately rm size is not available for Brazil.
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also make use of informal contracts. On average, 8% of jobs and around 20% of the
hiring in rms with more than 250 employees are informal. Similarly, not all small
rms are completely informal. This fact is corroborated by data from the Mexican
microenterprise survey (ENAMIN) run every two years. This survey reinterviews
those who in the ENEU claim to be either self-employed or owners of a microrm
(less than 6 employees) and obtains detailed information about their operations, and
most importantly for this paper, on the status of the workers they hire.11 Table 3
shows, by size and year, the percentage of rms that are completely formal (i.e. all
workers they employ are registered with the social security), completely informal, or
they use a mix of formal and informal contracts. Two observations are of particular
interest in this table. First, there is direct evidence that there is a within rm margin
of informality. Between 20% to 30% of rms of 4 and 5 employees use a mix of formal
and informal contracts. Second, for all rm sizes the degree formalization falls during
the crisis of 1995 and recovers to the pre-crisis value by 2002. This suggests that this
margin is sensitive to changes in the business cycle even for very small rms.
Table 2: Degree of Formality by Firm Size. Mexico. Average:1987-2004.
Size Share of Share of % of Formal % of Total
Formality Emp. Flows from u. Flows from u.
1 to 10 15.83 42.29 10.97 47.38
11 to 15 62.36 3.55 44.99 4.17
16 to 50 76.84 9.49 61.99 10.86
51 to 100 85.26 5.29 73.00 6.13
101 to 250 89.64 3.79 78.87 4.07
More than 250 92.04 35.59 79.39 28.15
Source: ENEU 1987-2004
11See data appendix for details.
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Table 3: Degree of Formality of Small Firms
by Number of Employees. Mexico 1992-2002
Employees Type 92 96 02
F 10.78 7.75 13.50
1 I 89.22 92.25 86.50
M
F 17.63 16.06 20.39
2 I 77.04 79.40 72.82
M 5.33 4.54 6.80
F 28.80 18.67 30.86
3 I 58.58 69.07 59.48
M 12.62 12.27 9.67
F 25.60 19.76 41.61
4 I 54.40 53.89 42.95
M 20.00 26.35 15.44
F 41.33 32.89 42.25
5 I 36.00 42.11 29.58
M 22.67 25.00 28.17
% Formal Emp. 28.38 22.38 31.37
F=all employees formal, I=All employees informal
M=Mixed of formal and informal employees
Source: ENAMIN 1992,1996 and 2002
Further evidence on the adjustment on the degree of formalization can be obtained
by looking at workers ows. Figure 9 shows the probability that a transition of a
worker from unemployment results in a formal contract for large and small rms.
This tries to capture propensity to hire formal workers, controlling for changes in
total hiring. This ratio is strongly procyclical for both small and large rms. While
one could argue that most of the changes in this ratio for small rms could be entirely
driven by creation and destruction of rms, it is somewhat harder to argue that this is
the case for large rms. In expansions between 20% to 15% of new hires are informal.
In the 1995 crisis this ratio increased to 33%. It is this margin of informality and
its adjustment what the model will exploit to explain the changes in the job nding
rates and ultimately on the share of formal employment.
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3 The Model
This paper introduces into a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) type of model a within
rm decision between two types of contracts; formal and informal. The intuition of
the model can be summarized as follows. Entrepreneurs post vacancies in search for
workers. The total number of matches between rms and workers, m, is given by
the matching technology
m = m(u; v) (1)
where v and u represent the number of vacancies and unemployed workers respec-
tively. The matching technology is homogeneous of degree one and increasing and
concave in both its arguments. The rate at which rms with vacant jobs nd workers
is given by
q() = m(u; v)=v (2)
where  = v
u
is generally referred to as the market tightness of the economy. Similarly
workers nd rms at a rate
q() = m(u; v)=u (3)
Workers are ex ante equal, but when the worker and the rm are brought together,
some match pairs result to be more productive than others. Once the productivity
of the match is realized, the rm has to decide whether to write a formal or an
informal contract with the worker or, alternatively, not to consummate the match
at all. There is a trade o¤ between formal and informal jobs. If a formal contract is
signed, the rm incurs in a hiring cost (i.e. the rm has to train the worker). Then,
the job-worker match has access to a better overall technology parameter, but they
have to observe a number of labour regulations.12 Conversely, informal jobs are less
productive but avoid all labour regulations imposed by the government. They are,
however, subject to monitoring and jobs may be destroyed if the government detects
them. Once the match is established both formal and informal jobs are subject to
idiosyncratic productivity shocks that may, endogenously, terminate matches.
12Initially I just consider hiring and ring cost as the only regulations. Section IV deals with
payroll taxes.
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3.1 Payo¤s
Let V be the present discounted value (PDV) to the entrepreneur of the expected
prot from posting a vacancy. Similarly, J lf (z) and Ji(z) represent the PDV for the
rm of occupied formal and informal jobs respectively, where l identies the new and
ongoing formal matches.
rV =  pk + q()
Z zmax
zmin
max

Jnf (z)  pc; Ji(z); V

dG(z)  q()V (4)
rJ lf (z) = pz   wlf (z) + 
Z zmax
zmin
max

Jof (s); V   pF

dG(s)  J lf (z) ; l = n; o (5)
rJi(z) = pz wi(z)+
Z zmax
zmin
max [Ji(s); V ] dG(s) Ji(z)+(V  Ji(z)) p (6)
The interpretation of equations (4) to (6) is straight forward. Vacant jobs have
a current ow cost of pk and vacancies meet workers at a rate q(): Once the worker
and the vacancy have met, the productivity of the match is drawn from a known
distribution function, G(z). Given the realization of the match specic productivity,
the rm has three choices. First, it can formalize the relationship, in which case
the rm enjoys Jnf (z) but has to pay hiring costs, cp, and it is subject to future
ring costs, pF . Second, the rm can also avoid regulations by hiring the worker
informally, Ji(z). Third, if the realization of the productivity is too low the rm can
decide to keep the vacancy open.
For occupied formal and informal jobs, the rst two terms capture the instanta-
neous prot of the job. That is, the combination of a general productivity parameter
p and the match specic productivity parameter z minus the wage in each type of
job. Note that formal jobs operate with a higher general productivity parameter
than informal jobs, being  < 1: I attribute this to the existence of the initial hiring
cost13. Moreover, the introduction of ring costs in the formal jobs gives rise to two
di¤erent value functions for occupied jobs. One for the newly created jobs Jnf (z),
(when ring costs are not applicable in the bargaining process) and another for on-
going matches for which ring costs are considered when wages are bargained, Jof
(see Pissarides 2000).
13See Gonzaga (2003), Almeida and Carneira (2005) for papers referring to the productivity
di¤erential between formal and informal jobs in Brazil.
12
All types of jobs are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks à la Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994): When a shock arrives at a rate  wages are renegotiated and
the job-worker pair decides whether or not to continue production. In the case of
formal jobs, if the job-worker pair decides to terminate the match, the rm has to
pay a ring cost, pF .14 Informal jobs are also subject to a monitoring activity from
the government that destroys the match at a rate : If informal matches are detected
the rm incurs in a penalty of p:
I assume that once the nature of the relationship between the worker and the
rm has been established (formal or informal) it cannot be modied. Hence, initial
formal jobs are always formal, independently of the evolution of the idiosyncratic
productivity shock. I relax this assumption in later sections of the paper.
The value functions for the workers, equations (7) to (9), have equally simple
interpretation; U represents the PDV of an unemployed workers. While searching,
the unemployed gets a value of b. They meet jobs at a rate q(): Depending on
the type of contract o¤ered by the rm, the worker enjoys the match specic PDV
of a new formal job W nf (z); or the PDV of an informal job Wi(z): Alternatively,
workers can decide to keep searching. Once the workers are employed, they obtain a
wage depending on the contract (formal/informal) and the productivity of the match,
which is subject to changes upon the arrival of shocks.
rU = b+ q()
Z zmax
zmin
max

(W nf (z);Wi(z); U

dG(z)  q()U (7)
rW lf (z) = w
l
f (z) + 
Z zmax
zmin
max

W of (s); U

dG(s)  W lf (z)) ; l = n; o (8)
rWi(z) = wi(z) + 
Z zmax
zmin
max [Wi(s); U ] dG(s)  Wi(z) + (U  Wi(z)) (9)
3.2 Bargain over wages
Following the literature, when workers and rms rst meet, or when an idiosyncratic
shock arrives, they bargain over the surplus of the job according to a Nash bargain
solution. In this particular model three types of bargaining situations may arise.
Equation (10) shows the bargaining rule for a new formal match, an ongoing formal
match and an informal match respectively.
14For simplicity I have considered that both types of jobs are subject to the same distribution of
shocks.
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Jnf (z)  pc  V =
(1  )

(W nf (z)  U) (10)
Jof (z)  V + pF =
(1  )

(W of (z)  U)
Ji(z)  V = (1  )

(Wi(z)  U)
where  is the share of the surplus that goes to the worker. When the worker and
the rm meet for the rst time and they decide to write a formal contract the gain
rm is Jnf (z)   pc   V . Since the match is not formed, the rm is not obliged to
any ring costs to the worker in the case of disagreement. However the rm has
to pay the hiring cost, pc; upon the signing of the contract. When a shock arrives
to an ongoing match, the ring cost becomes operational. However, the hiring cost
is already sunk. The gain for the rm of continuing the match is Jof (z)   V + pF .
Obviously, these considerations do not apply for the informal jobs.
Equation (10) also highlights a well known fact of Nash bargaining. Firms and
workers always agree on the type of contract, as well as when to destroy the match.
From the hiring point of view, rms are willing to hire a worker formally as long
as Jnf (z)   pc > Ji(z) and Jnf (z)   pc   V > 0, which necessarily implies that
W nf (z) > Wi(z) andW
n
f (z) > U: Similarly the rm-worker match choose an informal
contract if Jnf (z)  pc < Ji(z) and Ji(z) > 0.
3.3 Equilibrium
This section denes and characterizes the steady-state equilibrium of the model. Four
conditions determine the equilibrium of the model. The rst equilibrium condition
states that the creation of vacancies is driven by free entry. This implies that all
prot opportunities from new jobs are exploited and therefore V = 0:
The second and the third equilibrium conditions relate to the hiring decision of
the rm. These are given by
Jnf (R)  pc = Ji(R) (11)
Ji(W ) = 0 (12)
I dene R as the level of productivity that makes the rm indi¤erent between
hiring the worker formally or informally, equation (11). Let W be the level of pro-
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ductivity that makes the rm indi¤erent between hiring the worker informally or
keep searching for workers, equation (12).
The fourth and nal equilibrium condition of the model denes the job separation
threshold of formal jobs, equation (13). Let D be the productivity level that makes
an ongoing formal job unprotable. Since ring costs do not apply to informal jobs,
the job separation threshold of informal jobs is also given by W:
Jof (D) + pF = 0 (13)
Figure 10 illustrates the rms hiring and ring decisions. It plots the PDV for
the rm of the di¤erent contracts against the level of idiosyncratic productivity of the
match z. The protability of occupied jobs depends positively on the productivity
of idiosyncratic productivity of the match. This makes Jnf (z)   pc, Jof (z) + pF and
Ji(z) upward-sloping. However, the slope of the latter is atter because of the overall
productivity wedge, , and the existence of monitoring, : The xed costs of formal
jobs ensure the existence and uniqueness of R. Similarly, W and D are obtained in
the intersection of Ji(z) and Jof (z) + pF with the horizontal axis respectively. Of
course, it may be the case that these crossing points are not compatible with the
existence of informal jobs. I restrict my analysis to the spectrum of parameters where
both formal and informal jobs coexist, that is when R > W > 0.
I can now rewrite equations (4) to (9) using the di¤erent thresholds. For rms
pk = q()
Z zmax
R
 
Jnf (z)  pc

dG(z) +
Z R
W
Ji(z)dG(z)

(14)
rJ lf (z) = pz   wlf (z) + 
Z zmax
D
Jof (s)dG(s)  G(D)pF   J lf (z) (15)
rJi(z) = pz   wi(z) + 
Z zmax
W
Ji(s)dG(s)  (+ ) Ji(z)  p (16)
and for workers
rU = b+ q()[
Z zmax
R
 
W nf (z)  U

dG(z) +
Z R
W
(Wi(z)  U) dG(z)] (17)
rW kf (z) = w
k
f (z) + 
Z zmax
D
W of (s)dG(s) + G(D)U   W kf (z) (18)
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rWi(z) = wi(z) + 
Z zmax
W
Wi(s)dG(s) + G(W )U   (+ )Wi(z) + U (19)
Now it is clear what the optimal hiring decision of the rm-worker pair depends on
the idiosyncratic productivity of the match. When the worker and the rm meet for
the rst time, they jointly decide what type of contract to sign. If the idiosyncratic
productivity is higher than R the contract is formal, if it is between R and W the
contract is informal and if it is less than W no contract is signed. Once jobs start
production, they are subject to productivity shocks. Formal jobs are destroyed if
the productivity shock is lower than D; whereas informal jobs are destroyed if the
productivity shock is smaller than W:
Using (14) to (19) and the bargaining solution, equation (10), I can derive the
wage functions for each of the three types of matches, equations (20) to (22). Note
that all three wage functions depend positively on the productivity of the match. For
new formal jobs, the ring cost enters negatively as the workers have to compensate
the rm for future ring costs. For ongoing matches the ring cost enters positively,
since the rm has to pay the cost if the worker does not agree to continue the match.
All wages depend positively on the market tightness of the economy.
wi(z) = (1  )b+ p (z + k)  p (20)
wnf (z) = (1  )b+ p (z + k   F   (r + ) c) (21)
wof (z) = (1  )b+ p [z + k + rF ] (22)
With these wage functions and (14) to (19) it is straight forward to obtain the
four equilibrium equations of the model. Substitution of the corresponding wage
equation into (16) gives
Ji(z) =
1
r + + 

(1  ) (pz   b  p)  pk + 
Z zmax
W
Ji(s)dG(s)

(23)
Evaluating Ji(z) at W and subtracting it from equation (23) .
Ji(z) =
(1  )p (z  W )
r + + 
(24)
Finally substituting equation (24) back into (23) and evaluating at W; I obtain the
threshold that drives the value of an occupied informal job to zero. Note that this
16
threshold determines the lower limit of the hiring decision and the ring of informal
workers. It is also useful to get an expression for W for comparability with the
formal counterpart.
W =
b
p
+


+
k
(1  )  

r + + 
Z zmax
W
(s W ) dG(s) (25)
W =
b
p
+  +
k
(1  )  

r + + 
Z zmax
W
(s W ) dG(s)
Analogously for ongoing formal jobs
Jof (z) + pF =
(1  )p (z  D)
(r + )
(26)
D =
b
p
+
k
(1  )  

(r + )
Z zmax
D
(s D) dG(s)  rF (27)
Equations (25) and (27) constitute the two equilibrium conditions determining
job separations. The job separation rate in formal jobs is given by G(D). Informal
workers also su¤er job separations due to the exogenous government monitoring.
Therefore the job separation rate is given by G(W ) + . By comparing equations
(25) and (27), the rst result of the model is obtained. The job separation rate is
always greater for informal workers. This is due to three separate e¤ects. The type of
job specic productivity di¤erential, the existence of ring costs and the monitoring
of informal jobs. Note that, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), both types of jobs
are kept open even if the reservation productivity of the job is below the reservation
wage of unemployed workers, rU = b+ pk
(1 ) . This occurs because occupied jobs have
an option value, captured by the integral term in both equations. This option value
represents the potential increase in productivity for the job when a shock arrives.
This option value is higher for formal jobs, since, on average, informal jobs are less
productive and they have an external source of job destruction.
The third equilibrium equation determines the optimal hiring policy of the rm.
Substituting equation (21) into (15) gives the value of new formal jobs
Jnf (z)  pc =
(1  )p (z  D)
(r + )
  (1  )p (F + c) (28)
equating (28) to (24) I obtain what is the idiosyncratic productivity of the match
that makes the rm (and the worker) indi¤erent between a formal and an informal
contract, R:
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(1  )p (R D)
(r + )
  (1  )p (F + c) = (1  )p (R W )
r + + 
R =
(r + + ) [D + (r + ) (F + c)]  (r + ) W
(r + ) (1  ) +  (29)
Equation (29) states that the expected gain from the marginal formal worker
must be equal to the expected gain for the marginal informal worker.
The fourth and nal equilibrium equation of the model is the free entry condition.
Substituting (26) and (24) into (14) I obtain
k
q()
=
Z zmax
R

(1  ) (z  D)
(r + )
  (1  ) (F + c)

dG(z) (30)
+
Z R
W
(1  ) (z  W )
(r + + )
dG(z)
The left hand side of this equation represents the expected cost of the vacancy,
which has to be equal to the expected prot from posting the vacancy. From equation
(30), it is straight forward to see the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in
this model. As market tightness increases, the cost of the vacancy also increases, since
vacancies are kept unlled for longer periods of time. On the other hand, greater
market tightness means higher wages and higher job separation rates for formal and
informal jobs. This reduces the expected protability of the vacancy, lowering the
right hand side of the equation. Finally as  changes so does R, however it is easy to
show that, in equilibrium, R does not modify expected prots from the vacancy on
virtue of the envelope property it satises, that is, the productivity level that makes
the rm indi¤erent between hiring formal and informal workers. Hence for particular
values of F , c and k there is a unique value of ; that satises equation (30). Once 
is obtained, the di¤erent thresholds can be retrieved from equations (25), (27), and
(29).
Figures 11 and 12 show the equilibrium in the R- space and D;W - respectively.
From the hiring decision (29), there is a positive relation between R and  (see
appendix for proofs). The intuition is straight forward. Lower  leads to lower
wage demands. As a result, present and future prots for all types of jobs increase.
However, future prots of informal jobs are discounted at a higher rate. This is due
to the fact that duration of informal jobs is shorter. Overall, the surplus of formal
jobs increases more than the surplus of informal jobs. Therefore, R decreases.
Similarly, from equation (30), in equilibrium,  is independent of R, for the
reasons stated above. Figure 12 shows the job separation conditions for both types
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of jobs. These two conditions slope upwards on  since wages are positively related
to :
The steady state values of the stocks close the model.
u =
nfG(D) + ni (G(W ) + )
q()[1 G(W )] (31)
nf =
q()[1 G(R)]u
G(D)
(32)
ni = 1  nf   u (33)
 =
nf
ni + nf
where u is the unemployment rate and nf and ni the number of formal and informal
jobs in the economy. The labour force is normalize to 1. Flows in and out of
unemployment determine its steady state value. Flows into unemployment come
from occupied formal and informal jobs. Formal jobs are destroyed at a rate G(D);
whereas informal jobs are destroyed at at rate G(W )+: Flows out of unemployment
can be divided in two. The job nding rate of formal jobs is given by
JFRf = q()[1 G(R)] (34)
and the job nding rate of informal jobs is given by
JFRi = q()[G(R) G(W )] (35)
Finally,  captures the share of formal employment in the economy.
4 Comparative Statics
Next I examine the implications of changes in the key parameters of the model.
Two sets of parameters are particularly interesting; productivity shocks and policy
interventions.
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4.1 Macroeconomic shocks: Changes in productivity
Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the implication of an increase in productivity, p. Note
that changes in productivity are equivalent to the inverse changes in unemployment
benets, b. An increase in the general productivity parameter shifts both job sep-
aration conditions downwards. Similarly, the formal/informal hiring condition also
shifts downwards, since now rms and workers have more incentives to sign formal
contracts. This is because formal jobs are able to take better advantage of the in-
crease in productivity.15 Finally, the free entry condition is shifted to the right as
the expected prot from both types of jobs increases. From the graphs, there is an
unambiguous increase in the market tightness, however, the impact on R; D and W
is ambiguous. It is easy to show, however, that all three margins decrease, implying
a higher conditional probability of signing formal contracts and lower job separation
thresholds in both types of jobs (see appendix for proofs).
Proposition 1 An increase in productivity, p, reduces the job separation rate in both
types of jobs.
This is immediate from gures 13 and 14. In response to a good productivity
shock both D and W decrease. Hence, the job separation rate in both types of
jobs, G(D) and G(W ) + ; decrease. However, the model is silent in which of
these two probabilities decreases more. This depends on the assumptions about the
distribution of shocks, G(x).
Proposition 2 An increase in productivity, p, unambiguously increases the job nd-
ing rate of formal jobs, but has an ambiguous e¤ect on the job nding rate of informal
jobs.
The job nding rate of formal jobs is given by q()[1   G(R)]. It is useful to
distinguish between two separate e¤ects. On the one hand, the probability that a
worker meets a rm, which is governed by ; the meeting e¤ect : And on the other
hand, the conditional probability of signing a formal contract, [1 G(R)]; the o¤er
e¤ect. A positive productivity shock increases  and reduces R: Hence, the meeting
e¤ect and the o¤er e¤ect reinforce each other, highly increasing the chance of an
15Note that, all the e¤ects of changes in the overall parameter of productivity of the economy
come from the fact that income while unemployed, b, remains constant. There are other elements
that could be subject to changes in productivity such as the hiring costs, or ring costs, which
in this model are assumed to be proportional to productivity. In the short run, an increase in
productivity could reduce all those xed costs, strengthening the e¤ects highlighted here.
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unemployed worker of obtaining a formal job. This is consistent with the strong
procyclicality of the job nding rate of formal jobs found in Mexico and Brazil.
Similarly, the job nding rate of informal jobs is given by q()[G(R)   G(W )].
Again it is useful to separate the two e¤ects. Now the conditional probability of
signing an informal contract is given by [G(R)   G(W )]: A positive productivity
shock increases the meeting rate, but lowers R and W . In principle, this would
tend to lower the conditional probability of signing an informal contract, however
the exact e¤ect will depend on the properties of the distribution of shocks G(x):
Nevertheless, this change in the hiring policy of the rm is a candidate to explain
the relative stability of the job nding rate of informal jobs. I take up this issue in
the calibration of the model.
Proposition 3 An increase in productivity, p, unambiguously decreases unemploy-
ment but it has an ambiguous e¤ects on the relative size of formal employment.
The unemployment rate is determined by the exit rate from unemployment
q()[1 G(W )], the job separation rate in each type of job and the share of formal
employment. Positive productivity shocks generate lower job separation rates in all
jobs and increases the rate of exit from unemployment. Therefore, in the face of a
positive productivity shock unemployment can only increase if the share of formal
employment falls. However, it is easy to show from equation (32) that, if unem-
ployment increases so does the number of formal workers. Hence, it is not possible
that a drop in the share of formality as that would imply an increase in the number
of informal workers, incompatible with the fact that the labour force is constant:
Unemployment must, therefore, fall.
The share of formal employment should follow a procyclical pattern dictated
by the hiring decisions of the rm. However, the results are ambiguous, because
quantitative changes in job separation rates will depend on the distribution of shocks
G(x):
4.2 Protecting Formal Employment: Changes in ring costs.
Next, I analyze the economys response to changes in the ring penalties. Figures
15 and 16 show the graphical analysis. An increase in F shifts the job separation
condition of formal jobs downwards. Similarly, the formal/informal hiring condition
shifts upwards, capturing the fact that now formal jobs are more expensive. Now,
at any given market tightness, the match has to be of higher quality for the rm to
be willing to sign a formal contract. Finally, the free entry condition shifts to the
left as the expected prots from vacant jobs decrease. Overall, R increases whereas
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market tightness and both job separation thresholds decrease, especially for formal
jobs. This implies a reduction in the meeting rate and an increase in the conditional
probability of signing an informal contract (see appendix for proofs).
Proposition 4 An increase in ring costs, F; unambiguously decreases the job sep-
aration rate in both types of jobs.
This is analogous to the previous case since W and D decrease. The direct e¤ect
of the decrease in F lowers the job separation rate in formal jobs since now it is more
expensive to re workers. Indirectly, the decrease in market tightness decreases wage
demands in all types of jobs, diminishing the job separation rate in informal jobs
and further pushing downwards the job separation rate in formal jobs.
Proposition 5 An increase in ring costs, F; unambiguously decreases the job nd-
ing rate of formal jobs, but it has ambiguous e¤ects on the job nding rate of informal
jobs.
The decrease in the meeting rate and the higher standards for formal contracts
signicantly reduces the job nding rate of formal jobs. However, in this case the
conditional probability of signing an informal contract increases unambiguously. This
is due to the fact that the gap between R and W widens up. Note that the decrease
in W comes from the lower pressure on wages generated by a depressed market
tightness. The overall e¤ect on q()[G(R) G(W )] is again ambiguous, but points
to the fact that there are two opposing forces determining the job nding rate of
informal jobs.
Proposition 6 An increase in ring costs, F; has ambiguous e¤ects on the unem-
ployment rate and the share of formal employment.
Usually, models studying the impact of ring costs acknowledge two e¤ects (see
Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). First, a reduction of the job nding rate and second, a
lower job separation rate. Hence, the overall e¤ect on unemployment is ambiguous.
In this case, there is an additional e¤ect of substituting formal jobs, where the job
separation rate is low, by informal jobs, where the job separation rate is high. This
allocation e¤ect is captured by the rms choice of hiring standards. An increase in R
implies that vacancies that previously were being transformed into formal jobs now
become informal jobs when the meeting between a rm and a worker occurs. The
strength of this allocation e¤ect depends mainly on two parameters,  and : The
intuition is straight forward from equation (29). If the opportunity cost of employing
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informal labour is low (big ); or similarly, when its penalty is small (small ); small
changes in ring costs tend to have stronger reallocation e¤ects. This suggests that
developing countries, where the opportunity cost of informality is low, the allocation
e¤ects between the formal and informal jobs can be substantial.
5 Extensions
I consider three extension to the main framework. First, I have assumed that the
initial nature of the job cannot be modied during its life. I relax this assumption
here. Second, I consider the decision of becoming an informal self employed rather
than an informal employee. Finally, I introduce payroll taxes in the model.
5.1 Informal upgrading and direct ows from informal to
Formal jobs
I assume now that the worker-rm pair can decide the best contract at any time. It
is easy to argue that only contracts initially established as informal may have the
incentives to be transformed into formal contracts. The opposite is never optimal.
The intuition is simple. If the worker-rm pair in an informal match receives a positive
idiosyncratic shock it may decide to formalize the contract. For that to happen,
the boost in idiosyncratic productivity needs to cover the xed cost associated to
the formalization of the contract (the hiring costs and the future ring costs). On
the other hand, in order to downgrade a job the rm has to dissolve the previous
contract, which implies paying the associated ring costs. It is easy to see that for
any z; Jf (z) + pF > Ji(z), and therefore, there are no protable opportunities to
take advantage of.
There are only minor modications with respect to the basic version of the model.
The ow values for the informal jobs have to take into account the potential upgrad-
ing of the job. This modies the job separation condition for the informal workers.
Now the option value of the job incorporates the possibility that the job may be-
come formal. This implies thatW is smaller, but still bigger than D. Therefore, R is
greater. In other words, informal contracts are more attractive. The new equations
are given by
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rWi(z) = wi(z) + 
Z zmax
R
W nf (z) + 
Z R
W
Wi(s)dG(s) (36)
+G(W )U   (+ )Wi(z) + U
rJi(z) = pz   wi(z) + 
Z zmax
R
 
Jnf (s)  pc

+
Z R
W
Ji(s)dG(s)  (+ ) Ji(z)  p
W =
b
p
+


+
k
(1  )  

r + + 
Z R
W
(s W ) dG(s)
 1

Z zmax
R

(s D)
(r + )
  (F + c)

:
An interesting feature of this extension is that, implicitly, the upgrading of in-
formal jobs generates direct ows from informal to formal jobs. The probability of
transition from an informal job into a formal job is given by  [1 G(R)]. This makes
the direct transitions from informal jobs towards formal jobs procyclical, something
consistent with the data. Note, however, that there is no search process involved in
these transitions as workers remain in the same rm but with di¤erent status. The
steady states values vary to account for these transitions from informal jobs into
formal jobs and are given by
u =
nfG(D) + ni (G(W ) + )
q()[1 G(W )] (37)
nf =
q()[1 G(R)]u+ [1 G(R)]ni
G(D)
ni = 1  nf   u
The results on the behaviour of the job nding and job separations rates do not
change.
5.2 Informal salaried vs. Informal Self-employed
Informality is an heterogeneous phenomenon. Maloney (1999 and 2004) and Yamada
(1996) have strongly argued that a substantial part of the informal employment in
Latin American countries is concentrated in the informal urban self-employed. In-
deed, in my data between 40-50% of informal workers are informal self-employed.
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This section briey explores how to integrate the within rm margin of informality
into a more general framework considering the self-employment decision. I follow
Fonseca et al. (2001) to assume that agents can choose their occupation. Agents are
heterogeneous in their managerial ability and they choose occupation among three
di¤erent options. Agents may become formal entrepreneurs, informal entrepreneurs
or workers in search for a job o¤ered by the formal entrepreneurs. Formal entrepre-
neurs can manage several jobs at the same time, but informal entrepreneurs can only
employ themselves.
There is a distribution of managerial ability F (), which is continuous in the
interval [0; 0]. Being 0 the best manager in the economy. The decision between
the two types of entrepreneurship and becoming a worker is taken by the individual
attending to the PDV of each of the options. If the agent  opens a formal rm he
would post  vacancies and has to bear some start up costs T , which account to the
loss of wealth he has to undertake in order to legally set up a formal rm: If agent
 chooses to be an informal self-employed he avoids the start up costs but can only
employ himself enjoying a ow income of . Finally, the individual can become
a worker in search of a job and obtain U; which is independent of the managerial
ability of the agent. I make two simplifying assumptions here for the shake of brevity.
I assume exogenous job separations in both types of employment. As observed in
the data, the job separation rate is higher in informal jobs, i > f . Stochastic job
matching still applies for formal rms. However, I assume that all matches yield a
positive surplus. This implies that all matches between rms and workers will result
in job formation.
Figure 17 shows the PDV of the three di¤erent occupational choices according to
the managerial ability, for a given  (see the appendix for derivation of the equilib-
rium). First, the PDV of unemployment, U , is independent of the managerial ability
of the agent. Second, as the managerial ability increases so does the number of va-
cancies posted by the formal entrepreneurs. This explains the upward sloping curve
of V ()  T . Finally, the better the managerial ability the higher the PDV for the
informal entrepreneur. Two thresholds in the managerial ability distribution are rel-
evant in this context. First, I dene L as the managerial ability that leaves the agent
indi¤erent between a opening a formal rm and becoming informal self-employed.
L =
T
V ()   (38)
Note that in order for this threshold to exist V () has to be greater than : Second,
the managerial ability, M , that makes the agent indi¤erent between searching for a
job and becoming an informal self-employed.
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M =
U()

(39)
This set up illustrates two additional margins in which informality can operate.
The decision to become an informal self-employed is determined by these two mar-
gins. On the one hand, some agents may decide to be informal entrepreneurs because
the returns to search are low. These are the agents just to the right of M: On the
other hand, capable managers do not nd it protable to undertake the start up
costs of formality, T , and therefore they become informal entrepreneurs. These are
the agents just to the left of L. In summary, to the left ofM , agents become workers
and look for jobs. Between M and L, agents are informal self-employed. Agents
with managerial ability greater than L start up a formal rm, post vacancies and
exploit the within rm margin of informality. Some of those vacancies will turn into
formal/informal jobs according to the match specic productivity of the match.
Consider now an increase in ring costs. In this set up changes in regulations will
not only a¤ect the within rm margin of informality, but also the other two margins
of informality. Similar to the basic framework, ring costs changes the within rm
margin of informality and also reduces the surpluses of formal matches reducing the
value of both V and U . This modies the other two margins of informality expanding
the number of informal self-employed. The increase in the number of informal self-
employment comes form two sources. First, some agents get discouraged in the
face of low returns to search (decrease in M) and decide to become self-employed.
Second, some formal entrepreneurs choose to go underground as the value of posting
vacancies decrease (increase in L). Overall, informality expands not only because of
the within rm contract decision, like in the benchmark model, but also because of
the expansion of the informal self-employed.
5.3 Payroll taxes
I introduce a payroll tax t to which the employer is subject to. Thus, employers
have to pay now wf (z)(1 + t) in their formal labour contracts. There are two e¤ects
associated with the introduction of the payroll tax. It reduces the surplus of formal
matches and it also reduces the share of the surplus allocated to the rm. This
generates an asymmetry between formal and informal jobs.
All the e¤ects on the model work through the two job separation conditions. In
this case the job separation rate in formal jobs is not unambiguously higher than
that of informal jobs. There is a new term in both job separation equations, 
. This
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term captures the increase of the bargaining power of the workers. Changes in the
value functions are given by
W =
b
p
+


+

(1  )
k
(1 + t)
(40)
  
r + + 
Z zmax
W
(s W ) dG(s) + 

(1 + t)
D =
b(1 + t)
p
+
k
(1  )  

(r + )
Z zmax
D
(z  D) dG(s)  rF + 


 = tq()
Z R
W
 (z  W )
(r + )
dG(z)
6 Calibration
This section explores quantitatively the predictions of the model. I take the average
values of the Brazilian labour market as benchmark for the calibration.
The time span of the exercise is a month. The interest rate, r; is 0.01. I normalize
the overall productivity parameter to 1. As standard in the literature, I assume a
log linear matching function such as
q() 
where  is a scale parameter. I set  equal to 0.5. To my knowledge, there are no
estimates of an aggregate matching function for Brazil or any comparable developing
country. This choice of parameter is often used in the literature and it is within the
estimates reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). Similarly, the bargaining
power of both types of jobs is set to 0.5. Initially, I consider the monitoring of
informal jobs, ; to be equal to 0. There is no evidence on what part of the job
separation rate in informal jobs is due to the supervision of the government, but its
size in many developing countries suggests that the e¤ects of such punishment policies
are negligible. Regarding the idiosyncratic distribution of shocks, I have assumed a
uniform distribution between 0 and 1. This assumption, although arbitrary, is of
little importance to the results here presented. I have also explored log normal and
exponential type distributions with very similar results.
I set the arrival rate of shocks, , equal to 0.05. For a given , I set the job
separation threshold of informal jobs, W; consistent with a 3.2% job separation rate
in informal jobs. With knowledge of the job separation rate in informal jobs I obtain
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the value of the optimal hiring decision, R; that matches the percentage of new
formal to informal jobs given by ( 1 G(R)
(GR) G(W ) = 0:42).
There is no evidence on the level of labour market tightness in Brazil. I initially
assume that market tightness is equal to 2/3. With this I obtain ; matching an
average job nding rate in the formal of formal jobs, q()(1 G(R)); of 9.2%. The
number of informal and formal workers and the job separation rate in formal jobs are
chosen to match an average unemployment rate, u, of 5.5%. I also introduce payroll
taxes in the calibration of the model. The World Bank estimates that the average
payroll tax in Brazil is 37.3% of wages. I set t = 0:37:
Five parameters remain to be calibrated: F; ; c; b and k. I use the four equi-
librium equations of the model to solve for F; c; b and k. I choose  to be the free
parameter and set it to 0.625. This allows me to explore the impact of changes in .
Table 4 shows the parameter conguration for the exercise.
Table 4: Parameter Conguration
 = 0:05 F = 9:30
r = 0:01 b = 0:16
 = 0  = 1:38
 = 0:625 c = 0:07
 = 0:5 t = 0:37
k = 0:46 p = 1
I solve for the remaining parameters of the model and check some values to assess
the plausibility of the result. I obtain that k is 0.46. In the steady state, this implies
that the cost of vacancies is 2.98% of output. The choice of  implies that the average
wage in informal jobs is 81% of that in the formal. Close to the 0.75 and 0.68 found
for Mexico and Brazil respectively. The value for b is 0.16 which is 40% of the lowest
wage in the economy. The level of ring costs, 9.3, represents 15 months of average
wages of formal jobs. The World Bank estimates for ring costs in Brazil correspond
to 8.5 months of average wages. Finally, the value of c, 0.07, adds up to 17% of
output.
6.1 E¤ects of individual policies
I analyze the quantitative e¤ects of changes in productivity and three di¤erent poli-
cies: ring costs, hiring costs and payroll taxes. This is shown in table 5.
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Table 5: Calibration Results.
Baseline p = 10% F = 0:05 c = 0:05 s = 0:05
u 5:4 4:90 5:90 8:08 6:42
JFRf 9:2 10:42 6:38 2:38 6:35
JFRi 21:9 21:88 24:3 27:47 24:37
G(D) 0:86 0:83 0:77 0:86 0:87
G(W ) +  3:2 3:18 3:19 3:2 3:3
 0:66 0:70 0:64 0:61 0:64
 60:93 64:58 52:25 24:44 47:58
R 0:89 0:88 0:92 0:97 0:92
W 0:64 0:636 0:638 0:639 0:638
D 0:172 0:166 0:153 0:171 0:183
Changes in productivity produce all the expected outcomes. A 10% increase
in productivity decreases unemployment form 5.4% to 4.90%. Note that the most
sensitive variable is the job nding rate of formal jobs which increases from 9.2% to
10.42%, whereas the job nding rate of informal jobs only experiences a negligible
decrease of 0.02 percentages points. This is, of course, because of the change in
the rms hiring standards. Market tightness, as expected, increases and so does the
share of formality in the economy from 60.93% to 64.58%.
The next two columns of table 5 analyze the impact of the xed cost of formality;
ring and hiring costs. In order to allow comparable results, these two parameters
are increased by the same amount, 0.05, which corresponds to 17% of the average
formal wage. Both policies directly inuence the hiring decision of the rm, shifting
the threshold at which jobs are made formal. Moreover, they also reduce overall
market tightness. As argued before, these two combined e¤ects diminish the job
nding rate of formal jobs. The job nding rate of informal jobs increases. The main
di¤erence in the e¤ects of these two policies is related to the behaviour of the job
separation rates. An increase in ring costs decrease the job separation threshold in
formal jobs through two channels. A direct one, making dismissal more costly, and
an indirect one, through diminished wage demands (lower market tightness). Hiring
costs only activate the indirect channel. Hence, the job separation rate responds more
to changes in ring costs. This implies that, reallocation from formal into informal
jobs will be more intense when hiring costs change. Consequently, unemployment
rate and the share of formality also vary more.
Finally, payroll taxes a¤ect directly the incentives to hire a formal worker by
reducing the net productivity of the match for the rm. Contrary to the previous
two policies, it also increases wages demands a¤ecting therefore the job separation
condition of formal workers. The job nding rate of formal jobs decreases whereas
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the job separation rate increases. The job nding rate of informal jobs increases
accordingly responding to the new set of incentives. Overall, unemployment increases
and formality decreases.
6.2 Determinants of the reallocation e¤ect
The essence of the quantitative e¤ects of the model lies on how much rms adjust
their hiring standards when a change in policy occurs. I have argued before that
this depends on the opportunity cost of using informal labour. In this model, the
opportunity cost of informality is embodied in two parameters,  and : The higher
the opportunity cost of informality (lower  and higher ), the less powerful the
shift in employment will be. Tables 6 and 7 present the policy experiments for a
recalibrated model, where I decrease  to 0.55 (table 6), and increase  to 0.002
(table 7).
Table 6: Calibration Results ( = 0:55)
Baseline p = 10% F = 0:05 c = 0:05 s = 0:05
u 5:4 5:00 5:66 7:11 6:08
JFRf 9:2 10:09 6:99 4:00 7:24
JFRi 21:9 22:11 23:85 26:32 23:69
G(D) 0:86 0:84 0:76 0:83 0:87
G(W ) +  3:2 3:18 3:19 3:18 3:19
 0:66 0:70 0:64 0:62 0:65
 60:93 63:47 55:15 36:72 51:87
R 0:893 0:886 0:917 0:952 0:915
W 0:64 0:636 0:637 0:636 0:637
D 0:172 0:167 0:152 0:166 0:180
Both tables report similar e¤ects. Identical changes in productivity and policy
parameters have now a lower impact in the economy. A 10% change in productivity
only increases the job nding rate of formal jobs by 0.89 and 0.79 percentage points,
respectively, compared to 1.22% before. Similarly, since the substitution of formal
workers is less intense, the job nding rate of informal jobs presents a procyclical pat-
tern, indicating that the meeting e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect. Moreover,
both the unemployment rate and the rate of formality are less a¤ected by changes
in policy. Changes in unemployment rate are between 20% and 50% smaller and
changes in the share of formality between 30% and 40% smaller.
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This exercise also highlights an interesting e¤ect. Developing countries, in which
the opportunity cost of informality is likely to be small, are more likely to be subject
to strong shifts of labour between informal and formal jobs in the presence of shocks
and changes in regulations.
Table 7: Calibration Results ( = 0:002)
Baseline p = 10% F = 0:05 c = 0:05 s = 0:05
u 5:4 5:05 5:72 7:35 6:21
JFRf 9:2 9:99 6:85 3:62 6:94
JFRi 21:9 21:94 23:92 26:54 23:91
G(D) 0:86 0:84 0:76 0:84 0:91
G(W ) +  3:2 3:19 3:19 3:19 3:19
 0:66 0:69 0:64 0:62 0:64
 60:93 63:35 54:48 34:09 50:4
R 0:893 0:874 0:910 0:951 0:909
W 0:60 0:597 0:598 0:599 0:598
D 0:172 0:167 0:152 0:169 0:182
In summary, all policies aimed to increase regulation in formal jobs decrease the
market tightness of the economy reducing the meeting rate between vacancies and
workers. Additionally, these policies change the incentives to hire and re formal
workers. Overall, the job nding rate of formal jobs is the main variable driving the
reallocation between formal and informal jobs. Although the theoretical e¤ects of
policies are ambiguous, the simulations show that the net e¤ects tend to increase
unemployment and decrease the share of formality.
7 Conclusions
This paper studies the dynamics of labour markets with informal jobs. It explicitly
considers the within rm margin of informality with a double purpose. First, changes
in this margin can help explain the most relevant stylized facts in labour markets
where the presence of informal jobs is widespread. And second, it can be used to
analyze the impact of a variety of labour market regulations in a developing economy.
The essence of the model is that the divide between formal and informal jobs in
developing countries does not only occur across formal and informal rms. Informal
jobs can be found in, otherwise, formal rms. This suggests that rms not only
choose how many vacancies to post, but also what the optimal degree of formality is.
I show that positive productivity shocks produce a large impact on the job nding
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rate of formal jobs, as observed in the data. This comes as a result of two separate
e¤ects. First, rms increase vacancy creation and second, rms are more willing to
hire formal workers. That is, the degree of formalization in all rms of the economy
increases.
This model also highlights the importance of allocation e¤ects of policy interven-
tions in developing countries. Stricter regulation invariably lowers the job nding
rate of formal jobs. Policies have di¤erent e¤ects on the job separation rate depend-
ing on whether they aim to protect jobs (such as ring costs) or they do not (such
as payroll taxes and hiring costs). Further, the behaviour of the job nding rate in
the two types of jobs transfers workers from formal jobs, where job separation is low,
into informal jobs, where job separation is high. Theoretically, the overall e¤ects on
unemployment and the size of formality are ambiguous. However, this paper shows
that in countries where the opportunity cost of employing informal labour is small,
this reallocation e¤ect may be very large, generating a fall in the share of formal
employment and an increase in the unemployment rate.
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8 Appendix A: Proofs
8.1 Positive relationship between R and  in the hiring de-
cision.
Partial derivative of R; equation (29) with respect to  is given by
@R
@
=
1
[(r + ) (1  ) + ]

(r + + )
@D
@
  (r + ) @W
@

(41)
The derivative of job separation thresholds (27) and (25) with respect to  is
given by
@D
@
=
(r + )k
[r + G(D)] (1  ) > 0 (42)
@W
@
=
(r + + )k
[r + + G(W )] (1  ) > 0 (43)
Since W > D this implies that
(r + + )
@D
@
> (r + )
@W
@
(44)
and therefore
@R
@
=
1
[(r + ) (1  ) + ]

(r + + )
@D
@
  (r + ) @W
@

> 0 (45)
8.2 E¤ects of an increase in bpon ; R;W and D
Total derivative of the free entry condition (14) with respect to b
p
is given by
d
d b
p
=
 (1  )q()

[1 G(R)]
(r+)
@D
@ b
p
+ [G(R) G(W )]
(r++)
@W
d b
p

k() + (1  )q()
h
[1 G(R)]
(r+)
@D
@
+ [G(R) G(W )]
(r++)
@W
@
i < 0 (46)
where
() =  @q()
@

q()
> 0 (47)
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@D
@ b
p
=
(r + )
r + G(D)
> 0 (48)
@W
@ b
p
=
(r + + )
r + + G(W )
> 0 (49)
The total derivative of the job separation condition (27) of formal jobs with
respect to b
p
gives
dD
d b
p
=
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r + G(D)
(50)
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Since (1  )@D
@
= k @D
@ b
p
and (1  )@W
@
= k @W
@ b
p
; equation 50 simplies to
dD
d b
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=
(r + )
r + G(D)
24 k()
k() + (1  )q()
h
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Similarly for the job separation threshold of informal jobs,
dW
d b
p
=
(r + + )
[r + + G(W )]
24 k()
k() + (1  )q()
h
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Again since W > D
(r + + )
dD
d b
p
> (r + )
dW
d b
p
(53)
and therefore
dR
d b
p
=
1
[(r + ) (1  ) + ]
"
(r + + )
dD
d b
p
  (r + ) dW
d b
p
#
> 0 (54)
hence, a increase in b
p
decreases  and increases all three margins R, W and D:
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8.3 E¤ects of changes in F on ; R;W and D
Total derivative from the free entry condition (14) with respect to F gives
d
dF
=  
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h
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In this case, the total e¤ect of F on R depends on

dD
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The total e¤ect of F on dD
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Given that dW
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= @W
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Therefore an increase in F decreases ,D and W and increases R:
8.4 E¤ects of changes in  on ;R;W and D
Total derivative from the free entry condition (14) with respect to  gives
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The total e¤ect of  on R depends on dD
d
and dW
d
given by
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The total e¤ect of  on W is given by
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Given that dD
d
< 0; hence
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=
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)dD
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[(r + ) (1  ) + 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Therefore an increase in  decreases ,D and R and increases W:
8.5 Equilibrium with Informal Self-Employed
Given a distribution F () of managerial ability L and M are dened as
L =
T
V ()   (65)
M =
U()

(66)
The following equations represent the value functions for rms and workers under
the assumption of exogenous job separations
39
rV =  pk + (1  )q()
Z zmax
R
Sf (z)dG(z) +
Z R
W
Si(z)dG(z)

(67)
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The surplus for the formal and the informal workers is given by
Sf (z) =
pz   rV   rU   fpF   (r + f ) pc
(r + f )
(68)
Si(z) =
pz   rV   rU
(r + i)
Partial derivative with respect to  gives,
@rV
@
< 0
; @rU
@
> 0 (69)
According to equations (66) and (65), this implies a positive relationship between
 and the two thresholds of managerial ability M and L.
The values for nf , ni;and u can be derived from the steady state conditions of
the employment equations. The equation determining the evolution of employment
in each formal (informal) rm is
_nf () = (  n())q() [1 G(R)]  fnf () (70)
_ni() = (  n())q()G(R)  ini())
Adding up across rms
_nf = (
Z 0
L
dF ()  n)q() [1 G(R)]  fnf (71)
_ni = (
Z 0
L
dF ()  n)q()G(R)  ini
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In the steady state _nf = _ni = 0; so the equilibrium values for nf and ni are
nf =
(
Z 0
L
dF ()  n)q() [1 G(R)]
f
(72)
ni =
(
Z 0
L
dF ()  n)q()G(R)
i
Adding up employment for the two types of jobs gives.
n = nf + ni (73)
n =
[1 G(R)]i + fG(R)
(fi + [1 G(R)]iq() + fq()G(R))q()
Z 0
L
dF ()
Similarly, unemployment can be dened as
u =
Z 0
L
dF ()  n

(74)
Using (73), (74) and the fact that G(M) = u+n, I obtain the second equilibrium
condition of the model. This gives a negative relationship between  and L:
G(M) =
fi + q() [1 G(R)]i + fG(R)q()
 (fi + [1 G(R)]iq() + fq()G(R))
Z 0
L
dF () (75)
9 Appendix B: Data, Denitions of Informality
and Computation of Transition Probabilities.
Mexico: Data on ows of workers
The data for Mexico are drawn from the National Urban Employment Survey
(ENEU) that conducts quarterly household interviews in the 16 major metropolitan
areas. The questionnaire is extensive in its coverage of participation in the labour
market, wages, hours worked, etc. that are traditionally found in such employment
surveys. The ENEU is structured so as to track a fth of each sample across a ve
quarter period. I have concatenated panels from the rst quarter of 1987 to the
fourth quarter of 2004.
The ENEU has su¤ered only minor modications during the covered period but
it has substantially changed its geographical coverage. From 1988 to 1992 the survey
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comprised 16 major urban areas. In 1992 18 more urban areas were introduced
and throughout the following years additional cities were included in the sample to
reach 44 at the beginning of 1998. The sample is constraint to the original 16 cities
although all results are similar with extended the sample.
I broadly follow the ILO denition of informality by dividing employed workers
into two types of employment: formal and informal workers. I classify them on
the basis of lack of compliance with labour legislation- in particular lack of contri-
butions by the employer to the social security agency, IMSS (or the equivalent for
civil servants IMSTS)- as the critical distinguishing characteristic. I also consider
informal workers those self-employed and owners of micro rms (less than 6 employ-
ees) with no social security contributions, excluding professionals and technicians.
Owners of medium or large rms (more than 5 employees) and those professionals
and technicians self-employed or with social security contributions are all considered
formal.
Mexico: Data on small rms.
The second data source for Mexico is the National Survey of Microenterprises
[Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN)], which reinterviews a sample of
the self-employed individuals covered in previous rounds of the ENEU. These surveys
ask detailed questions on the characteristics of rms with up to ve employees (15 in
manufacturing), including information on capital stock, time in business, and access
to credit from formal and informal sources, both for starting the business and at
a later time and characteristics on the employees they hire. The employer has to
report on the characteristics of each one of his/her employees, as well as, weather any
payment towards social security contributions is made for that worker. This way I
can obtain what is the percentage of rms that are completely formal, or completely
informal or the employ a mixture of both formal and informal contracts.
Brazil
The data for Brazil are draw fromMonthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal
de Emprego, hereafter PME ) that conducts monthly household interviews in 6 of
the major metropolitan regions (covering 25% of the national labour market). The
questionnaire is extensive in its coverage of participation in the labour market, wages,
hours worked, etc. that are traditionally found in such employment surveys. The
PME is structured so as to track each household during four consecutive months and
then drop them from the sample for 8 months, after which they are reintroduced for
another 4 months. The rotation procedure is such that each month one fourth of the
sample is substituted by households to form a new panel. Thus, after 4 months the
whole initial sample has been rotated and after 8 months a third di¤erent sample is
42
being surveyed. After 12 months the initial sample is reencountered. Over a period
of two years, three di¤erent panels of households are surveyed, and the process starts
again with three new panels. I have concatenated panels from the January 1983 to
December 2002. Regrettably, the PME was drastically modied in 2002 and it is not
possible to reconcile the new and old denitions unemployment.
Similar to Mexico the critical factor for my denition of informality is whether the
worker is in possession of a work-card or carteira de trabalho that entitle the worker
to labour rights and benets. In the case of Brazil the survey does not provide
rm size so I consider informal only the self-employed, excluding professionals and
technicians . Excluding or including owners from the data does not alter the results
in any signicant way.
Computation of Transition Probabilities.
I assume a homogenous Markov process X(t) dened over a discrete state-space
E = f1; : : : :Kg where K is the number of possible states (types of jobs) a worker
could be found in. I dene 4 employment statuses. Inactivity, unemployment, infor-
mal employment and formal employment. Since the data are tabulated at discrete
points in time we can compute the probability pij(t; t+n) = Pr(X(t+n) = j;X(t) =
i):The interpretation of pij is simply, the probability of moving from state i to state
j in one step (n). Discrete time probabilities are straight forward to compute as
the maximum likelihood estimator for pij is pij =
nij
ni
being nij the total number of
transitions from state i to state j and ni the total number of observations initially in
state i. I then smooth the series using a moving average lter with a three quarter
window.
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rate and Share of Formal Jobs. Mexico 1987-2004. Constructed
with quarterly data from the National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU). % For is the share
of formal employment constructed as number of formal workers over total employment.
Unemployment rate (Unem. Rate) corresponds to number of unemployed workers over
total labor force. The series have been smoothed using a moving average lter with a three
quarter window.
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Figure 2: Unemployment Rate and Share of Formal Jobs. Brazil: 1983-2001. Constructed
with monthly data, quarterly averaged, from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME). %
For is the share of formal employment constructed as number of formal workers over total
employment. Unemployment rate (Unem. Rate) corresponds to number of unemployed
workers over total labor force. The series have been smoothed using a moving average lter
a with a three quarter window.
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Figure 3: Job Finding Rate and Unemployment rate. Mexico: 1987-2004. Constructed
with quarterly data from the National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU). Unm-For and Unm-
Inf correspond to the average probability of transiting from unemployment into formal
and informal employment respectively. Unemployment rate (Unem. Rate) corresponds to
number of unemployed workers over total labor force. The series have been smoothed using
a moving average lter with a three quarter window.
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Figure 4: Job Finding Probabilities and Unemployment rate. Brazil: 1983-2001. Con-
structed with monthly data, quarterly averaged, from the Monthly Employment Survey
(PME). Unm-For and Unm-Inf correspond to the average probability of transiting from
unemployment into formal and informal employment respectively. Unemployment rate
(Unem. Rate) corresponds to number of unemployed workers over total labor force. The
series have been smoothed using a moving average lter a with a three quarter window.
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Figure 5: Job separations and Unemployment Rate.Mexico: 1987-2004. Constructed with
quarterly data from the National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU). For-Unm and Inf-Unm
correspond to the average probability of transiting from formal and informal employment
into unemployment. Unemployment rate (Unem. Rate) corresponds to number of un-
employed workers over total labor force. The series have been smoothed using a moving
average lter with a three quarter window.
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Figure 6: Job separationsand Unemployment Rate. Brazil: 1983-2001. Constructed with
monthly data, quarterly averaged, from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME). For-
Unm and Inf-Unm correspond to the average probability of transiting from formal and
informal employment into unemployment. Unemployment rate (Unem. Rate) corresponds
to number of unemployed workers over total labor force. The series have been smoothed
using a moving average lter a with a three quarter window.
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Figure 7: Compositional Contributions of Changes in the Share of Formal Employment.
Mexico 1987-2004. The unconditional series corresponds to the value of the time dummies
of a probit regression of the probability of being formal on time dummies. In the case
of the conditional series gender, age, education, industry and occupational dummies are
included in the regression.
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Figure 8: Compositional Contributions of Changes in the Share of Formal Employment.
Brazil 1983-2001. The unconditional series corresponds to the value of the time dummies
of a probit regression of the probability of being formal on time dummies. In the case
of the conditional series gender, age, education, industry and occupational dummies are
included in the regression.
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Figure 9: Relative Formal Hiring from Unemployment. Large vs Small Firms. Mex-
ico, 1987-2004. Constructed with quarterly data from the National Urban Labor Survey
(ENEU). The series show the probability of obtaining a formal contract conditional on leav-
ing unemployment by rm size. The series have been smoothed using a moving average
lter with a three quarter window.
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Figure 10: Equilibrium Thresholds.
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Figure 12: Equilibrium: Job Destruction
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Figure 14: Increase in Productivity
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Figure 15: Increase in Firing Costs
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Figure 16: Increase in Firing Costs
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Figure 17: Equilibrium with Informal Self-Employed.
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